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Corporate Ethics: Approaches and Implications to
Expanding the Corporate Mindset of Profitability
Arthur Acevedo*
“The highest use of capital is not to make more money, but to make
money do more for the betterment of life.”1 – Henry Ford
This Article discusses the convergence of law and ethics in the context
of corporations. It begins by detailing past attempts at and limitations on
regulating corporate conduct. It then explores the business judgment rule
in the context of ethical conduct. Finally, it considers the growing
influence of millennials and social investing on corporate conduct, and
concludes by cautioning corporate directors to adopt ethical practices in
order to remain relevant in the marketplace.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenarios and decide whether the corporate
actions2 can be described as ethical: (i) to avoid ordering a product recall,
a board of directors chooses instead to pursue a litigation and settlement
strategy; (ii) to circumvent a mandatory 10 percent employee profitsharing requirement, a board creates two companies with the first one
capturing 99 percent of the profits from sales and marketing activities,
and the second one providing the needed labor force on a cost basis plus
1 percent of the first company’s profits; (iii) a board chooses to ignore
repeated calls for increased racial and gender diversity within its
management ranks while simultaneously actively selling products and
services to members of minority communities. Though ethically
questionable because of the negative distributive effects on society, there
is nothing inherently illegal about the decisions taken by the board of
directors in these illustrations. In fact, almost all directors will defend
their actions by stating it is their sole duty to increase corporate wealth
and shareholder value.
In light of these scenarios, the question to consider is, are ethics and
corporate profitability mutually exclusive? Specifically, does the
corporate decisionmaking process allow for inclusion of ethical factors?
If so, what framework of analysis should corporate management use
when weighing its choices and actions?3 For example, is a
“consequentialist model” that focuses on the ultimate outcome
preferable? Is a “utilitarian model” that focuses on the greatest good
provided to the greatest number of individuals superior? Or is the
emerging “applied ethics model” that creates and applies a set of specific
norms within a distinct environment the soundest approach?4
2. The scope of this Article is limited to for-profit entities such as corporations, LLPs, and LLCs.
Throughout this Article I chose the corporation and its governance structure as my means of
analysis, although the same decision process for ethical considerations applies with equal force to
LLCs and LLPs.
3. An analysis of the various schools of thought are beyond the scope of this Article.
4. For example, professions (e.g., legal, medical) and industries (e.g., construction) may adopt
their own set of ethical rules. The following statement illustrates the moral hazard in applied ethics:
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Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.5 gave voice to what has become an inviolable
principle in corporate law:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change
in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.6

Corporate decisions—such as a strategic alliance, a capital investment,
or the hiring of a key employee7—have remained true to the singular
objective of maximizing corporate wealth and increasing shareholder
value. But the question remains: is a singular profit-oriented focus
warranted, or is a broader approach that includes ethical outcomes
desirable?
Globalization, privatization, and industry consolidation all fueled an
upward trajectory for the major post-World War II economies.8 Emerging
markets, developing industries, and ground-breaking technologies all
contributed immensely to the economic growth. The profit maximization
principle articulated in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is now firmly ensconced
throughout many of the world’s economies. However, the economic
growth and its accompanying opportunities have not been without
controversy. For instance, a glance of recent headlines reveals
questionable corporate conduct: Mylan’s EpiPen price gouging scandal;9
Wells Fargo’s fake accounts scandal;10 Volkswagen’s emissions

“A former head of the N.H.T.S.A. testified on Ford’s behalf, stating that in his opinion the Pinto’s
design was no more or less safe than that of any other car in its class, like the Chevrolet Vega or
the A.M.C. Gremlin.” See Malcolm Gladwell, The Engineer’s Lament, THE NEW YORKER (May
4, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/04/the-engineers-lament (examining
different schools of thought regarding automotive safety).
5. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
6. Id.
7. Disney hired Michael Ovitz with the expectation that he would remedy Disney’s then-current
weaknesses including “poor talent relationships and stagnant foreign growth.” In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 37 (Del. 2006).
8. For an excellent discussion on the effects of globalization see STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS
CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW, 105–30
(N.Y. Univ. Press 2013).
9. Katie Thomas, Mylan’s Chief Is Chastised by Lawmakers Questioning EpiPen Pricing, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/business/mylan-chief-to-insistepipen-is-priced-fairly-at-house-hearing.html.
10. Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargofined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html.
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scandal;11 and Arthur Andersen’s accounting scandal.12 These are but a
few of the numerous examples illustrating the hazards of unrestrained
capitalism. Although varied across industry sectors, these scandals all
share a common theme—the pursuit of profit through some form of
corporate misdeed.
Corporations are created for the sole purpose of organizing a collective
activity and pursuing a profitable venture. Unlike individuals who
possess cognitive abilities, self-rule, and choice of action, corporations
are juridical entities acting through a board of directors. A corporation
establishes its social and commercial identity through the decisions of its
board of directors. Therefore, while corporations are creatures of the law,
enjoy the protections of the law, and are subject to the law, they obviously
lack the inherent values that make one human. They lack the objects of
will, choice, and cognition. Corporate directors must supply the values
when making corporate decisions. We have reached the point in history
where corporate decisions can no longer ignore the broader social and
ecological implications of corporate action while pursuing profitability.
A path to responsible profitability must be found.
Law and ethics run on parallel paths. They converge because both
involve value judgments about choices and actions. They converge
because both require judgments and rationalizations in the
decisionmaking process. And, they converge because both contain norms
for expected behaviors. However, they diverge in a significant and
substantive effect: the law creates enforceable rights and legal
consequences, whereas ethics does not.
I. ATTEMPTS AND LIMITATIONS IN REGULATING CORPORATE CONDUCT
Legislating business conduct becomes necessary when market forces
fail to address a situation when employees or consumers demand reform
or when legislators perceive a need for regulation. However, legislating
and regulating business conduct presents its own sets of challenges. Two
monumental events during the twentieth century illustrate the challenges
and limitations encountered in undertaking such effort.

11. Jack Ewing, Engineering a Deception: What Led to Volkswagen’s Diesel Scandal?, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/business/volkswagen-dieselemissions-timeline.html.
12. Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Arthur
Andersen Fires an Executive for Enron Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/enron-s-collapse-overview-arthur-andersen-firesexecutive-for-enron-orders.html.
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A. Laissez-Faire Prevails
The first of these events was the rise of the Lochner Era, so named by
economic historians and legal academics after the case of Lochner v. New
York.13 This was a period of time that spanned the years from 1905 to
1937. This was also a period of time when federal and state governments
enacted protectionist legislation in an attempt to regulate working hours,
working conditions, and minimum pay for the American worker.
However, the Supreme Court declared many federal and state statutes
unconstitutional on the basis that such statutes exceeded Congress’
commerce power,14 or such statutes interfered with an individual’s
“liberty” interest contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Lochner v. New York,15 the state of New York enacted a statute that
regulated the maximum hours an employee can work. The objective of
the law was deemed “to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to
safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals who are
following the trade of a baker.”16 The United States Supreme Court
declared the state statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reasoned:
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of
contract . . . concerning the number of hours [an employee] may labor
in the bakery of the employer. The general right to make a
contract . . . is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.17

The Lochner decision set in motion a judicial philosophy that
economic legislation was to be subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny
despite legislative attempts at regulation. This approach shaped American
law for the next three decades18 and influenced attitudes about
exploitation and profitability.
The case of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia
is another example of protectionist legislation that failed to achieve its
purpose. Here, the District of Columbia enacted legislation establishing
a minimum wage with the objective of “supply[ing women workers] with
the necessary cost of living, [in order to] maintain them in health and
protect their morals. . . .”19 The Supreme Court held that a statute which
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
16. Id. at 58.
17. Id. at 53.
18. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Supreme Court shifted its philosophy from
subjecting economic legislation to increased judicial scrutiny to a lesser form of judicial scrutiny.
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
19. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of Dist. of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 540 (1923).
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“provid[ed] for the fixing of minimum wages for women and children in
the District of Columbia”20 was unconstitutional. In particular, the Court
reasoned:
Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private
property . . . is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of
property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment,
by which labor and other services are exchanged for money or other
forms of property.21

Federal and state legislators perceived a need to enact legislation
during the Lochner Era as a protective response to the overreaching and
exploitive employers. These protections—be they hours,22 wages,23
working conditions,24 or consumer protection25—were deemed
necessary by legislatures during a period of time that saw American
economic activity transform from a local activity, to a regional activity,
and finally into a national activity.
B. On a Collision Course
The second monumental event occurred near the end of the twentieth
century when a series of Supreme Court cases set the doctrines of punitive
damages and due process on a collision course. The precedents set by
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,26 State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,27 and Philip Morris USA v. Williams28
redound to the benefit of corporations because of their limiting effect on
punitive damages. Corporations abhor uncertainty because of its
imprecise effects on economic modeling. These cases firmly establish the
proposition that excessive punitive damages are a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.29 The twin effect of these cases is that they substantially
weaken the law of punitive damages and provide corporate planners with
a measure of certainty in the form of a de facto cap on damages.
At issue in these cases is a conflict of values between two legal
doctrines—punitive damages and the Due Process Clause. The theory of
20. Id. at 539.
21. Id. at 545, overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
22. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 47.
23. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 539.
24. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
25. Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
26. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1996) (creating a threeprong test to be used when assessing the constitutionality of punitive damages).
27. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412–14 (2003).
28. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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punitive damages holds that punitive damages may be awarded to punish
and deter wrongful activity by the defendant.30 The theory of the Due
Process Clause ensures that a person’s right to life, liberty, and property
is not impaired by government action unless and until applicable due
process considerations have been satisfied.31
C. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,32 the plaintiff, Dr. Ira Gore,
purchased a new BMW automobile for $40,750.88 from an authorized
dealership in Birmingham, Alabama. Nine months later, “Dr. Gore took
the car to ‘Slick Finish,’ an independent detailer, to make it look ‘snazzier
than it normally would appear.’”33 The painter informed Dr. Gore that his
car had previously sustained damage and that it was repainted. Dr. Gore
filed a lawsuit against BMW and the authorized dealer alleging “that the
failure to disclose that the car had been repainted constituted suppression
of a material fact.”34 BMW defended the practice by arguing that cars
that sustained less than 3 percent property damage were repainted and
sold as new in accordance with its company policy. BMW maintained
“that it was under no obligation to disclose repairs of minor damage to
new cars and that Dr. Gore’s car was as good as a car with the original
factory finish.”35
The jury found BMW liable and awarded $4,000 in compensatory
damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court reduced the punitive damages from $4 million to $2
million. BMW challenged the damages and appealed the case to the
United States Supreme Court.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether “[t]he Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (AM. LAW INST. 1979):
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and
others like him from similar conduct in the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing
punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of the defendant’s
act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended
to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
31. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976) (establishing the standard for
determining what procedures are required in a given case).
32. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1996) (creating a threeprong test to be used when assessing the constitutionality of punitive damages).
33. Id. at 563.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 564.
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‘grossly excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor.”36 The Supreme Court
ruled the damages unconstitutional. It reasoned that “[e]lementary
notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate
that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject
him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose.”37 The Supreme Court’s decision relegated the doctrine of
punitive damages to a subordinate role when a conflict arises with the
Due Process Clause.
D. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell
In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,38 Curtis Campbell,
insured by State Farm, attempted to pass six cars on a two-lane highway
in Utah. An oncoming car, driven by Todd Ospital, swerved onto the
shoulder to avoid a head-on collision with Curtis Campbell. However,
Todd Ospital lost control of his car and “collided with [another] vehicle
driven by Robert G. Slusher.”39 Robert Slusher was rendered
“permanently disabled.”40 Todd Ospital lost his own life in the accident.
State Farm “decided to contest liability and declined offers by Slusher
and Ospital’s estate,” choosing instead to defend against a tort action and
a wrongful death action.41 At trial, “a jury determined that Campbell was
100 percent at fault, and a judgment was returned for $185,849, far more
than the [$50,000] amount offered in settlement.”42 State Farm refused to
cover the $135,849 in excess liability. 43 The record indicates that State
Farm’s counsel told the Campbells, “‘[y]ou may want to put for sale signs
on your property to get things moving.’”44 The record also indicates:
State Farm ignored the advice of one of its own investigators and took
the case to trial, assuring the Campbells that “their assets were safe, that
they had no liability for the accident, that [State Farm] would represent
their interests, and that they did not need to procure separate counsel.”45

State Farm’s actions in this case seem to belie its “well-understood and
well-publicized policy of holding itself out as a ‘good neighbor,’ offering
insurance products premised upon assuring consumers ‘peace of

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 562.
Id. at 574.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412–14 (2003).
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 413.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (alterations in original).
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mind.’”46
Dismayed and distraught by the turn of events and fearing financial
ruin, “[t]he Campbells . . . filed a complaint against State Farm [in state
court] alleging bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”47 Following a complicated appeals process, the Utah Supreme
Court “reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award”48 against
State Farm.
The next appeal was to the United States Supreme Court, where the
Supreme Court rejected the imposition of the $145 million punitive
damage award. Citing the evolving punitive damage precedents,49 the
Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary
punishments on a tortfeasor.”50
E. Philip Morris USA v. Williams
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams,51 the widow of the decedent, Jesse
Williams, filed a lawsuit against the Phillip Morris company “for
negligence and deceit.”52 The widow claimed that the business practices
of the Philip Morris company caused the death of her husband. “A jury
found that Williams’ death was caused by smoking; that Williams
smoked in significant part because he thought it was safe to do so; and
that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe that this was
so.”53 The jury also determined that Philip Morris engaged in deceit and
negligence. It “awarded compensatory damages of about
$821,000 . . . along with $79.5 million in punitive damages.”54
On appeal, the Supreme Court declared the punitive damage award
unconstitutional and reasoned that “the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a
defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they
directly represent, [meaning], injury that it inflicts upon those who are,
essentially, strangers to the litigation.”55
46. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., Case No. 890905231, 1998 WL 35159343, at
*2j (D. Utah Aug. 3, 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001).
47. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 414.
48. Id. at 415.
49. Cooper Indus. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001); BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996).
50. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 416.
51. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 349–50.
54. Id. at 350.
55. Id. at 353.
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These three cases present complex questions of individual autonomy,
corporate responsibility, and ethical considerations. These cases also
illustrate the powerful and wide-ranging limits the U.S. Constitution
places on efforts to deter and redress behavior through punitive damage
awards. BMW v. Gore places substantive procedural limits on punitive
damages, State Farm v. Campbell creates the presumption that doubledigit damages awards are unconstitutional, and Phillip Morris v. Williams
excludes from consideration the effect on third parties by the tortfeasor.
The cumulative effect of these cases is not only to displace state
regulatory schemes, but also to elevate “‘fairness’ in punishment” 56 to a
more exacting judicial scrutiny. Viewed objectively, these cases tip the
scale against ethical considerations by corporate defendants because
plaintiffs must now not only plead and prove punitive damages, but also
determine whether the punitive damages sought are themselves
unconstitutional.
F. Legal Action but Unethical Conduct
Consider the following cases as studies in ethical conduct. When so
viewed, they highlight another aspect of the tension between ethical
conduct and permitted legal action. While the underlying acts are not
illegal, the consequences of the actions taken leave an undesirable ethical
outcome.
1. Efficient Breach and Ethics
At times the law allows individuals to invoke a legal defense and
disregard their contractual performance obligations. Such is the case
when performance under a contract is excused in cases of impossibility,
impracticability,57 or frustration of purpose.58
The doctrine of efficient breach59 functions in effect as an excuse of
performance because one party fails to perform. Technically, however, it
is not an excuse. Instead, it operates as a unilateral substitution of one
party’s expectation interest by awarding damages for the nonperformance of the counter-party. The doctrine of efficient breach
“supports a rule that allows one party to a contract to breach and pay
damages rather than perform, at least where it is worth more [to the
56. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
58. Id. at § 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
59. For an excellent discussion on efficient breach, see Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient
Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 777, 785–86 (2012). The writer “identified a number of
straightforward and well-known objections to the argument laid out in the previous section.” Id. at
785.

2018]

Corporate Ethics

647

breaching party] to breach rather than to perform.”60 Rather than
complete a performance obligation, the breaching party opts to trigger
expectation damages as the substitute for the performance.
Essentially, where it is worth more to the promisor to breach rather
than . . . perform a contract, it is more efficient for the law to allow the
promisor to breach the contract and . . . pay the promisee damages
based on the benefit the promisee expected to gain by the completed
contract.61

The efficient breach doctrine is a particularly sinister form of contract
jurisprudence because it denies the contracting party the benefit of his
bargain by substituting expectation damages for completed performance.
There is nothing legally impermissible with this approach. It is what the
law prescribes. There is, however, something ethically questionable with
unilaterally altering the expectation interest of the counter-party without
his or her consent.
2. Non-Disclosure and Ethics
Absent a statutory or fiduciary duty to disclose, the common law in
some states does not impose upon sellers of personal property a general
duty of disclosure.62 As a consequence, unsuspecting purchasers may
unwittingly pay more than fair market value for a good or a service.63
This was the case in Levine v. Blue Shield of California.64 In November
2004, Michael Levine purchased insurance coverage for himself and his
two minor dependents. In October 2007, he married his wife, Victoria,
and sought to add her to the policy. In August 2009, Blue Cross raised
their premiums by 30 percent.65
Michael learned that the monthly premiums that he had been paying
since adding Victoria to his plan would have been substantially lower
60. Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 562 (Cal. Ct. App.
2017) (internal quotations omitted).
61. Huynh v. Vu, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 595, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Fred S. McChesney,
Tortious Interference with Contract Versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence,
28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (1999)).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (emphasis added):
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other
to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability to
the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed
to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to
disclose the matter in question.
63. The IRS defines fair market value “as the price at which the property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller when the former is not under any compulsion to buy
and the latter is not under any compulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts.” Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (1959).
64. Levine v. Blue Shield of Cal., 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 266–67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
65. Id.
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if Victoria, rather than Michael, had been named as the primary insured,
and if Michael had added his dependents to a single health plan rather
than maintaining a separate health plan for one and a separate insurance
policy for the other.66

Michael immediately changed his insurance elections to adjust the cost
of his insurance premiums and modify his insurance coverage. “Michael
also requested a refund of all ‘overpayments of premiums.’ Blue Shield
refused to provide a refund.”67 The court determined that Blue Shield was
not under an obligation to disclose the lower monthly premium nor issue
a refund.68 Levine unfortunately illustrates that the doctrine of caveat
emptor is still a viable doctrine.
3. Misleading Statements, Materiality, and Ethics
Basic v. Levinson is generally associated with the fraud-on-the-market
theory69 and the definition of materiality.70 When viewed from an ethical
perspective, however, Basic raises serious questions of corporate
integrity and unethical conduct by the board of directors.
The shareholder-litigants were “former Basic shareholders who sold
their stock between Basic’s first public denial of merger activity and the
suspension of trading in Basic stock just prior to the merger
announcement. . . .”71 The shareholder-litigants claimed they “were
injured by selling their shares at prices artificially depressed by those
statements.”72
Corporate management denied on three separate occasions that the
company was not aware of the reasons for the increased activity in the
company’s stock. The first denial “appeared in the Cleveland Plain
Dealer,” a major newspaper, when “‘[Basic] President Max Muller said
the company knew no reason for the stock’s activity and that no
negotiations were under way with any company for a merger.’”73 The
second denial occurred when “reply[ing] to an inquiry from the New
66. Id. at 267.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 274.
69. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988) (“The fraud on the market theory is
based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s
stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business.”)
(quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)).
70. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32 (“[T]o fulfill the materiality requirement there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”)
(internal citations omitted).
71. Id. at 224.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 228 n.4.
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York
Stock
Exchange,
Basic
issued
a
release . . . [stating] . . . ‘management is unaware of any present or
pending company development that would result in the abnormally heavy
trading activity and price fluctuation in company shares. . . .’”74 The third
denial occurred when “Basic issued to its shareholders a ‘Nine Months
Report 1978[,]’ [which stated:] ‘With regard to the stock market activity
in the Company’s shares we remain unaware of any present or pending
developments which would account for the high volume of trading and
price fluctuations in recent months.’”75
Notwithstanding the legal ruling by the Supreme Court,76 Basic mixes
complex questions of disclosure and deception, and pushes the bounds of
ethical conduct. The facts in Basic are further complicated by the
dynamics of ever-changing market conditions. The pressures on
corporate management during this event are unimaginable. In an
environment of such turbulence and uncertainty, the best response from
a legal and an ethical perspective is “no comment.”
II. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND ETHICAL CONDUCT
Does the business judgment rule exclude consideration of ethics by a
board member in the decisionmaking process? Simply stated, the answer
is “no.” As currently interpreted by the courts, the business judgment rule
permits consideration of economic and noneconomic factors by a board
of directors when weighing competing factors. The Delaware courts have
indicated:
The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and
free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.
The rule itself is a presumption that in making a business decision, the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.77

The following cases illustrate the broad range of discretion directors
enjoy when making corporate decisions.
A. Protecting Board Considerations of Non-Equity Constituents
In Schlensky v. Wrigley,78 the plaintiff, a minority shareholder,
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 238 (“[I]n order to prevail on a Rule 10b–5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the
statements were misleading as to a material fact. It is not enough that a statement is false or
incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is otherwise insignificant.”).
77. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens,
965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
78. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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challenged the decision by the board of directors to refrain from installing
lights in Wrigley Field, the home baseball field for the Chicago Cubs.
Schlensky, the plaintiff, presented evidence that other baseball teams had
installed lights in their fields, that night games produced more revenue
for teams with lights, and that the majority shareholder and director,
Philip K. Wrigley, expressed concerns that night baseball would be
upsetting to the neighbors.79
The court rejected the plaintiff’s contention. The court reasoned that
“it cannot be said that directors, even those of corporations that are losing
money, must follow the lead of the other corporations in their field.
Directors are elected for their business capabilities and judgment and the
courts cannot require them to forego their judgment. . . .”80 The
defendant prevailed on the strength of the business judgment rule.
Schlensky v. Wrigley81 can be read as supporting the proposition that
directors may take into consideration economic and noneconomic factors
when making corporate decisions.
B. Protecting a Board’s Loss-Making Decision
In Kamin v. American Express, the court demonstrated a high degree
of deference to the judgment of the board of directors. Two minority
shareholders filed suit challenging a decision by the board of directors to
issue a property dividend to the shareholders in lieu of claiming a tax
deduction on the corporate tax return. Claiming the tax deduction would
have saved the company approximately $8 million in federal income
taxes.82
The court nonetheless rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge and reasoned
that “[i]t is not enough to allege, as plaintiffs do here, that the directors
made an imprudent decision, which did not capitalize on the possibility
of using a potential capital loss to offset capital gains. More than
imprudence or mistaken judgment must be shown.”83 The court was
unwilling to second guess the director’s wisdom in choosing among
competing alternatives. The court added:
Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or action,
adequacy of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate funds to
advance corporate interests, are left solely to their honest and unselfish
decision, for their powers therein are without limitation and free from
restraint, and the exercise of them for the common and general interests
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Kamin v. American Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809–10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
Id. at 813.
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of the corporation may not be questioned, although the results show that
what they did was unwise or inexpedient.84

The court emphasized:
[D]irectors are entitled to exercise their honest business
judgment . . . and to act within their corporate powers. That they may
be mistaken, that other courses of action might have differing
consequences, or that their action might benefit some shareholders more
than others present no basis for the superimposition of judicial
judgment. . . .”85

Once again, the company directors prevailed by operation of the
business judgment rule. Kamin v. American Express supports the
proposition that directors, when faced with competing alternatives, may
opt for a course of action that may have a negative economic effect on
the company so long as they are acting in good faith.
C. Protecting “Stupid,” “Egregious,” or “Irrational” Board Decisions
In the case of In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation,86 the Delaware Court went even further in describing the
scope and the protections offered by the business judgment rule. In
explaining the business judgment rule, the court stated:
Whether a judge or jury considering the matter . . . believes a decision
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through “stupid”
to “egregious” or “irrational,” provides no ground for director liability,
so long as the court determines that the process employed was either
rational or employed in . . . good faith. . . .87

Caremark makes clear that a board of directors enjoys great latitude in
choosing among competing reasons, including ethical reasons, even if
such chosen factors are themselves suboptimal.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 815.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id. at 967.
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III. THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF MILLENNIALS88 AND OF SOCIAL
INVESTING
The board of directors of a corporation is empowered by statute to act
on behalf of the corporation.89 Notwithstanding this broad grant of
authority, history demonstrates that investors continually question
decisions made by corporate management. For instance, during the
Vietnam
War,
“[t]he
Medical
Committee
for
Human
Rights . . . [requested to include] a proposal to amend Dow’s Certificate
of Incorporation to prohibit the sale of napalm unless the purchaser gives
reasonable assurance that the napalm will not be used against human
beings.”90
Additional instances of shareholder activism include shareholders
questioning management decisions regarding theme-park smoking
policies,91 sales of assault rifles,92 and human rights violations and
discrimination matters.93
Shareholders and corporate management alike are critically examining
the ethics of corporate conduct. A study by PricewaterhouseCoopers
reports that “dismissals for ethical lapses rose from 3.9 percent of all
successions in 2007–11 to 5.3 percent in 2012–16, a 36 percent increase.
The increase was more dramatic in North America and Western
Europe.”94
88. The names and age ranges for the various demographic groups are:
Gen Z, iGen, or Centennials: Born 1996 and later.
Millennials or Gen Y: Born 1977 to 1995.
Generation X: Born 1965 to 1976.
Baby Boomers: Born 1946 to 1964.
Traditionalists or Silent Generation: Born 1945 and before.
See
American
Generations
Through
the
Years,
CNN
(May
5,
2011)
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2011/05/living/infographic.boomer/index.html (summarizing the
definitions of generations).
89. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2016) (“[A]ll corporate powers shall be exercised
by or under the authority of the board of directors, and the business and affairs of the corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of the board of directors.”).
90. SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 404 (1972). The proposal was
ultimately voted upon and received “[l]ess than 3% of all voting shareholders support[.]” Id. at 406.
91. See Walt Disney Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 4312760, at *2 (Dec. 22, 2010)
(“The Proposal requests that the Company’s Board of Directors direct management to modify the
Company’s ‘current smoking policy to not allow children within the designated smoking areas of
its theme parks (children being defined as any person not qualified by age to legally purchase
smoking materials).’”).
92. See Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 328–29 (3d Cir. 2015)
(challenging management’s decision to sell “the Bushmaster AR-15” (a model of sporting rifle)).
93. See Apache Corp. v. New York City Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (S.D. Tex.
2008) (seeking to “incorporate anti-discrimination directives based on sexual orientation and
gender identity into such activities”).
94. Per-Ola Karlsson, DeAnne Aguirre, & Kristin Rivera, Are CEOs Less Ethical Than in the
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Additionally, millennial investors are flexing their economic muscle
and believe they can reorder corporate priorities. This phenomenon has
not gone unnoticed. “[T]he aggregated net worth of global millennials is
predicted to more than double compared to 2015, with estimates ranging
from US$19 to 24 trillion.”95 A 2017 survey of millennials conducted by
Morgan Stanley reports that “75% say their investments can influence
climate change [and] 84% say their investments can help lift people out
of poverty.”96 A shift in investor attitudes is taking place as the
traditionalist generation and the baby-boomer generation age out of the
economy and society, and as millennials come of age. This shift in
investor attitude will influence how corporate decisions will be made in
the coming years.
CONCLUSION
Ethics is a mindset. Whether we speak of individual behavior or of
organizational behavior such as a corporation, ethics is a mindset which
implies the existence of an expected pattern of behavior by the actor. In
the case of a corporation, the board of directors is responsible for setting
this mindset. In abstract terms, the expectation of ethical behavior is no
different in form then a corporate mindset of managing costs, constant
innovation,97 or employee benefits.98 Ethics creates an expectation of a
Past? Why more chief executives are losing their jobs after scandals and corporate misconduct,
STRATEGY+BUSINESS (May 15, 2017), https://www.strategy-business.com/feature/Are-CEOsLess-Ethical-Than-in-the-Past?gko=50774.
95. Dr. Daniel Kobler, Felix Hauber, & Benjamin Ernst, Millennials and Wealth Management:
Trends
and
challenges
of
the
new
clientele,
DELOITTE
(June
2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-services/lu-millennialswealth-management-trends-challenges-new-clientele-0106205.pdf.
96. Millennials Drive Growth in Sustainable Investing, MORGAN STANLEY (Aug. 9, 2017),
http://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/sustainable-socially-responsible-investing-millennialsdrive-growth.html.
97. In promoting its corporate culture and mindset, the Apple Inc. jobs website describes itself
in the following terms: “We’re perfectionists. Idealists. Inventors. Forever tinkering with products
and processes, always on the lookout for better.” Jobs at Apple, APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/jobs/ae/corporate.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
98. Facebook employees consistently rank the company highly for employee benefits.
Facebook’s employee benefits for North America include:
Medical, dental and vision insurance to keep you and your family healthy; [m]edical
second opinion service to make sure you get the best care; [c]ompetitive retirement plans
to help you plan for the future; [l]ife insurance and survivor support to give you peace
of mind; [g]enerous vacation days so you can take time off when you need it; [p]aid
leave for new parents so you can bond with your family; [s]upport for family planning:
adoption and surrogacy assistance, and baby cash to help with newborn expenses;
[w]ellness allowance to support all your healthy activities; [e]mployee assistance
program; [t]ransportation support for a stress-free commute; [m]eals and snacks when
you need them.
Benefits, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/careers/benefits/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
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certain behavior by all members within the organization.
Unlike individuals, who come into daily contact with a limited number
of other people, corporations have the potential of touching thousands, if
not millions of lives each and every day. One court remarked:
[M]odern super-corporations . . . wield immense, virtually unchecked,
power. . . . The philosophy of our times . . . requires that such
enterprises be held to a higher standard than that of the “morals of the
market-place” which exalts a single-minded, myopic determination to
maximize profits as the traditional be-all and end-all of corporate
concern.99

There is growing evidence that the marketplace responds to ethical
conduct. Businesses that ignore ethical considerations do so at their own
peril. Consider, in this regard, the Volkswagen emissions scandal, its
devastating impact on corporate profitability,100 and the negative
publicity it received throughout the marketplace.101 The marketplace is
an increasingly interdependent, complex, and sophisticated economic
system. An unscrupulous move by a corporation can have ripple effects
throughout its supply, distribution, and sales chain. To remain
competitive and relevant in the marketplace, it will behoove corporations
to seriously consider ethics in its decisionmaking process.
It is only a matter of time before today’s millennials and iGens take
their seats and begin making decisions in our legislatures, courts, and
corporate boards. Corporate directors that fail to act in a responsible and
ethical manner will face mounting pressure to change. The shift in
investor attitude is already on the horizon. Let’s hope the shift arrives
before our society reaches the tipping point.

99. SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 409–10 (1972).
100. See Jack Ewing, VW, Setting Aside $18 Billion for Diesel Scandal Costs, Reports Record
Loss,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Apr.
22,
2016)
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/23/business/international/volkswagen-loss-emissionsscandal.html (discussing the record loss Volkswagen experienced after the scandal related to diesel
emissions).
101. See Matt Robinson, 11 Hilarious Reactions to the VW Emissions Scandal, CAR THROTTLE,
(2016)
https://www.carthrottle.com/post/11-hilarious-reactions-to-the-vw-emissions-scandal/
(showing examples of the public’s reaction to the Volkswagen emissions scandal).

